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BlueRock 2.7.0 (26.38.0)

Purpose of this Document

This document provides information about the features, enhancements, and known issues in BlueRock Release 2.7.0 (26.38.0). It applies to both new deployments and upgrades from earlier versions.

This release introduces robust Policy Enhancements, including human-in-the-loop approval and the BlueWarden egress security proxy; expanded BlueRock Connector capabilities, such as remote file share mounting; and secure Okta SSO integration via the BlueDev Identity Deployment Kit.


Revision History

Release Version

Release Date

v2.7.0 (26.38.0)


Supported Platforms / Distributions

BlueRock Release v2.7.0 (26.38.0) supports deployment across major public cloud providers.

The following operating systems have been validated for this release.

AWS

Distribution

Kernel

Amazon Linux 2023

6.12.114

Ubuntu 24.04

6.12.114

GCP

Distribution

Kernel

Ubuntu 24.04

6.12.114

Azure

Distribution

Kernel

Ubuntu 24.04

6.12.114


New Features and Enhancements

This release introduces robust Policy Enhancements including human-in-the-loop approval and the BlueWarden egress security proxy, expanded BlueRock Connector capabilities such as remote file share mounting, and secure Okta SSO integration via the BlueRock Identity Kit.

Policy Enhancements

Human in the Loop Approval

BlueRock provides policy rules that gate coding agents (Claude Code, Antigravity, Cursor, and Codex). These rules require human approval before executing specific tools or commands, rather than relying solely on logging or blocking remediations.

When a command or tool execution matches a configured policy, BlueRock presents the agent's native permission prompt to the operator, holding execution until explicit approval is granted. Interactive approval prompts display exclusively for Claude Code. For agents that do not support interactive approval prompts (such as Antigravity, Cursor, or Codex), configure remediate: true to enforce a hard block.

Limitations

  • Claude Code: Fully supports interactive approval prompts (remediate: "approval"), including when permissions are bypassed.

  • Antigravity, Cursor, Codex: Does not support interactive approval prompts. Configuring remediate: "approval" logs the action and permits execution. Set remediate: true to block execution.

  • Out-of-Path / Non-Sandbox Execution: Human-in-the-Loop policy enforcement operates strictly for coding agents running inside the BlueRock Sandbox container. Policy enforcement cannot occur for coding agents running outside the sandbox environment or inspection path.

Per User Policy

Administrators can configure runtime Sandbox policies and apply the policies directly to the BlueRock Sandbox created and accessed by specific user principals. The system authenticates these user principals via Google, Entra, Okta Single Sign-On (SSO), or SSH key authentication.

Sandbox Policies

In this release, BlueRock introduces granular observability configurations and system call controls:

  • File Operation Observability: Emit observability events for all file operations, or restrict events strictly to file write operations (only_writes) to prevent event flooding.

  • File Deletion Tracking: Observe specific file deletion operations inside the sandbox container.

  • Path Execution Restrictions: Restrict coding agent execution strictly to explicit file paths.

  • io_uring Interface Limits: Restrict io_uring system call usage inside the sandbox container.

System Call Evaluation & Fail-Closed Posture

  • Standard Evaluation: Monitored system calls evaluate against active policy rules and enforce the configured remediation (allow, block, or approval).

  • Evaluation Fault Behavior (Fail-Closed): If BRace cannot complete a policy evaluation due to a system fault (for example, if the connection between BRace and bluerockd drops and cannot be restored), BRace automatically denies the system call. The application receives a permission denied error, ensuring the sandbox container remains protected during evaluation failures.

BlueWarden (Egress Security)

BlueWarden operates as an optional, per-container egress HTTPS proxy for coding agents running inside the BlueRock Sandbox container.

Enablement and Configuration:

Administrators enable and configure BlueWarden by defining the warden block within the Sandbox application policy. A minimal structural example is provided below:

Supported egress policies include:

  • HTTP/HTTPS Endpoint Filtering: Controls which upstream hosts and URL paths the agent's requests allow.

  • Model Pinning: Governs which LLM IDs the agent may call.

  • DNS Control: Inspects DNS lookups and responses, governing DNS-over-HTTPS and DNS-over-TLS.

  • LLM Response Observation: Decodes the model's reply stream to emit telemetry regarding responses and tool-call intent.

  • L4 Egress Control: Denies all non-web TCP and UDP traffic by default unless explicitly allowed by destination IP and port. BlueWarden automatically drops QUIC connections to force clients to fall back to inspectable TCP.

  • Anti-SSRF Invariants: Re-resolves the request Host and inherently denies connections to private and cloud-metadata addresses. BlueRock strictly enforces the metadata address range and never relaxes the range.

Bouncer Policy

The Bouncer policy allows administrators to govern the specific bouncer operations users can perform on remote development workspaces such as creating, starting, stopping, renaming, mounting file shares, and destroying workspaces. The policy also enforces caps on the maximum number of remote sandbox containers a single user principal can create.

The policy requires two configurations:

  • bouncer_contract: A named contract defining policy options.

  • bouncer_contract_mapping: A mapping of the bouncer contract to a user principal ID.

    User

    Contract

    Effect

    admin.mail@domain.com

    admin

    Every action is allowed, and there is no container limit.

    Anyone at contractor.domain.com

    attach-only

    Can attach to existing containers but cannot create, start, stop, destroy, or rename them. The limit is 5 (the default).

    Any user authenticated with a plain SSH key

    catalog-only

    The up command works only from catalog templates; no git URLs or remote shares are permitted.

    Everyone else

    default

    Cannot destroy containers, and the limit is a maximum of 3 containers.


BlueRock Connector

Multi-Platform Support

The BlueRock Connector extends platform support to Linux, joining existing macOS and Windows support. Linux packages are provided as .deb and .rpm files for x86-64 and arm64 architectures across validated distributions: Debian, Ubuntu, RHEL, Fedora, and Amazon Linux.

Sandbox Idle Timeout Control

The BlueRock Connector extension/application introduces configurable options on the client side to maintain the running state of the remote sandbox container on the BlueRock Host/VM, or automatically stop the container after a disconnection.

The extension includes an Autostop configuration section with the following controls:

  • Keep running (never autostop): Keeps the sandbox running on the BlueRock Host/VM after the client side disconnects. The user must stop the container manually.

  • Grace after normal disconnection (minutes): Configures the waiting period after the client side editor closes.

  • Grace after dropped connection (minutes): Configures the waiting period after a client side connection drops unexpectedly.

Mount Remote File Share

The BlueRock Connector extension/application supports mounting external file storage directly onto the BlueRock Sandbox container running on the BlueRock Host/VM. Supported external file storage includes:

  • AWS EFS and AWS FSx

  • Azure Files

CLI --stdio Proxy Command Support

The BlueRock Connector CLI introduces the --stdio option. This option routes a single SSH connection between stdin/stdout and the local bridge process, enabling Claude Code Desktop IDE to establish SSH connections to remote sandbox workspaces under disableDesktopLocalSessions.

Port Forwarding

The BlueRock Connector extension/application securely exposes server applications running inside the remote BlueRock Sandbox directly to the local client-side desktop environment by executing a bluedev-relay program inside the sandbox container.


BlueDev Identity Deployment Kit

Okta SSO Support

The Identity Kit integrates with Okta OpenID Connect (OIDC) applications to permit secure remote workspace logins. This integration allows users to seamlessly authenticate and access the remote BlueRock Sandbox using their Okta account ID.

Auto-Renewal of Host Certificate

For the BlueDev container deployment using SSO, the BlueRock Host receives a host certificate with a fixed lifetime at the time of host enrollment with StepCA. BlueRock automatically renews these host certificates to prevent service disruption, eliminating the need for manual administrative intervention to maintain host connectivity.


Fixed Issues


Known Issues

BA-3057: BlueWarden does not enforce client.http_servers.deny_http and deny_sse

BlueWarden does not enforce the client.http_servers.deny_http and client.http_servers.deny_sse policy settings. Sandboxed agents can connect to MCP servers over HTTP and HTTP+SSE, even when administrators enable both denial parameters with an empty exception list.

Workaround

Configure the tools.deny_list policy for each specific MCP server IP address or hostname to restrict tool execution.


BA-3055: BlueWarden MCP client server lists require host IP matching

BlueWarden evaluates MCP server connection filters (tools, prompts, and resources) against destination host IP addresses rather than server-provided identity names (serverInfo). Configuring connection filters using server identity names (such as "FileServer") prevents policy rules from matching network traffic.

Workaround

In the MCP client policy, configure policy lists (such as target server allowlists) using destination host/server IP addresses (e.g., "10.0.0.13") or explicit IP regex patterns (e.g., "^10\\.0\\.0\\.13$") instead of server names specified in the MCP server program.


BA-3047: HTTP endpoint deny lists do not block provider-mediated web searches

HTTP endpoint deny-list policies enforce network filtering on direct web requests initiated inside the sandbox container (such as standard curl calls or Claude Code WebFetch). However, when coding agents utilize provider-hosted search tools (such as Codex using OpenAI search backend), the provider fetches web content externally on its backend. Because request traffic originates outside the local sandbox, BlueWarden cannot block provider-mediated search queries.

Workaround

Configure HTTP endpoint rules to block access to provider search backend endpoints (such as chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex/alpha/search) to prevent provider-mediated web searches.


BC-3441: Large Claude Code command-line handshakes truncated by bluerockd

When Claude Code executes Bash commands through the brace shim, extensive file mounts can cause the initial connection message sent to bluerockd to exceed the 64 KiB limit. As a result, bluerockd drops the oversized message, causing Bash commands in Claude Code to fail with an I/O error (unexpected end of file).

Workaround

Perform the following steps in the developer's environment prior to initiating Claude Code or creating the sandbox session:

  • Create a symlink pointing ~/.local/bin/bwrap to the system bubblewrap binary:

  • Verify that ~/.local/bin precedes the brace shim directory in the PATH environment variable:

  • Launch Claude Code, now Claude Code uses /usr/bin/bwrap directly from PATH, bypassing the brace shim during command execution.


BC-3432: Unexpected brace_connect events when Warden is disabled on the host

When any BlueWarden policy rules (warden.http, warden.llm, or warden.mcp) remain enabled in the policy configuration, brace_connect events continue to be generated even if brace.syscalls.connect is configured to minimal.

Workaround

To suppress these unmatched events, explicitly set unused warden.http, warden.llm, and warden.mcp rules to disabled within the policy configuration.


BC-3371 Restarting bluerockd disrupts existing sensor connections

Restarting the BlueRock Control Plane service disconnects existing BlueRock sensor connections, interrupting client-side AI agent and MCP applications.

Workaround

Restart all affected AI agent and MCP applications after restarting the bluerockd service.


BC-3381 Source-address ingress firewall rules not enforced

Source-address-based ingress firewall rules are not correctly enforced for BlueRock Sandbox containers.

Workaround

No workaround is currently available.

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